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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
S T A N D A R D O P T I C A L 
COMPANY, et al., 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
vs. I 
SALT L A K E C I T Y I 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
) Case No. 
S T A N D A R D O P T I C A L 1 3 9 2 4 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, I 
vs. I 
L A W R E N C E A. J O N E S , as Salt 
Lake City Auditor, et al., 
Defendants-Respondents. \ 
R E S P O N D E N T , SALT L A K E C IT Y 
C O R P O R A T I O N S B R I E F 
N A T U R E O F T H E CASE 
The plaintiff-appellants commenced two separate 
actions challenging the validity of a Salt Lake City 
special improvement district, created pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 10-16-1 et seq., Utah Code Anno-
I 
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tated 1953. They have challenged the jurisdictional and 
procedural aspects of that improvement district and 
seek to have the same declared void and enjoin further 
work on the project. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
After consolidating the two above enumerated 
cases, the lower court on August 19, 1974, partially 
granted defendant-respondent, Salt Lake City's Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment; subsequently, on an ex-
pedited hearing, held September 10, 1974, the lower 
court received testimony concerning the validity of the 
contract between the City and Gibbons and Reed. 
Thereafter, in a memorandum decision the lower court 
ruled that the special improvement district was validly 
created pursuant to law in every respect and that the 
contract between Salt Lake City and Gibbons and 
Reed was valid. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Salt Lake City as defendant-respondents, seek to 
have this court affirm the decision of the lower court 
and dismiss the appeal, awarding costs to the defend-
ants-respondents. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The facts as shown by the affidavits, the Findings 
of Fact of the lower court and the matters of record are 
as follows: 
2 
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1. For approximately eleven (11) years prior to 
1973, the Salt Lake City Commission had been consid-
ering a special improvement district concerning the 
area subject of the within litigation. They had ap-
pointed an ad hoc citizens committee for the purpose 
of considering what configuration such an improvement 
district should take. (Deposition of Mayor Jake Garn 
at p. 4; Affidavit of Mayor Jake Garn, R-33; Affi-
davit of City Engineer, Joseph Fenton, R-83). 
2. On or about December 4, 1973, the City En-
gineer submitted to the Board of Salt Lake City Com-
missioners, a cost estimate of the proposal, which pro-
posal was approved by said Board. The City At-
torney was directed to prepare a Notice of Intention 
for the creation of a special improvement district. (R-
110). 
3. On or about December 18, 1973, a Notice of 
Intention to create said district was prepared by the 
City Attorney. I t was thereafter submitted to and ap-
proved by the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners. 
As relevant to this appeal, said Notice of Intention, 
among other things, provided that: 
a. The purpose for the assessment was: 
"To remove all existing curbs, gutters, side-
walks and street paving and to construct new 
street paving, pedesfcran'?.nd planting, cu^b 
and gutters, together with new sir et lighting 
and draining structures, °nd to do all other 
work necessary to complete the project in 
3 
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accordance with Salt Lake City standards." 
* # * 
"All other necessary things shall be done to 
complete the whole project in a proper and 
workmanlike manner according to the plans, 
profiles, and specifications on file in the off-
ice of the Salt Lake City Engineer . . ." 
b. The nature of the improvements was to in-
stall and construct new curbs, gutters, side-
walks and street paving, 2%ether with ped-
estrian paving, landscape structures, plant-
ers and planting materials. Also new street 
lighting and draining structures would be 
constructed, together with those more spe-
cific items and alterations on file as plans, 
profiles and specifications in the Salt Lake 
City Engineer's Office. 
c. Described the boundaries of the district as 
that area of blocks, 57, 58, 69, 70, 75 and 76 
of Plat A of Salt Lake City Survey, within 
the area of South Temple Street on the North 
and Third South Street on the South, and 
between State Street on the East and West 
Temple Street on the West. 
d. The estimated cost of the project was $2,875,-
189.75, as determined by the Salt Lake City 
Engineer's estimate. The property owners 
would be charged and assessed a sum not to 
exceed said $505.00 per front foot. The City 
would pay the balance of the costs estimated 
to be $872,405.20. 
e. Protests should be filed on or before Janu-
ary 16, 1974, and that on the 17th day of Jan-
4 
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nary, 1974, the Board would consider such 
protests and objections that had been made. 
(R-57-58); see, notice printed as 1- appen-
dix. 
4. The aforesaid Notice of Intention was pub-
lished in the Deseret News, a newspaper of general 
circulation in Salt Lake City and within the County of 
Salt Lake, once a week for four (4) successive weeks. 
Said publications were on December 20, December 27, 
January 3, and January 10, which last publication date 
was at least five (5) days, but not more than twenty 
(20) days prior to the time fixed in the Notice as the 
last day for filing protests. (Affidavit of City Re-
corder, Herman Hogensen, R-51). 
5. On December 26, 1973, the Notice of Intention 
was mailed, postage prepaid to the registered owner of 
each lot, parcel, plot or real property located within 
the proposed Special Improvement District. (Affidavit 
of City Recorder Herman Hogensen, R-51). 
6. On January 17, 1974, at a regularly scheduled 
meeting of the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners, 
said Commission received all of the written protests 
filed and referred them to the Salt Lake City Engin-
eers Office and to City Attorney and to the Planning 
and Zoning Department for report and tabulation. 
Further, at said meeting, every person present was 
given an opportunity to protest and state his objections; 
however, it was recommended that a further meeting be 
held, after a complete tabulation of the protests. ("3?-
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fidavit of City Recorder Herman Hogensen, R-52; 
Deposition of Mayor Jake Gam, p. 22). 
7. On January 18, 1974, a notice was sent to each 
registered property owner and protester within the pro-
posed Special Improvement District No. 480, request-
ing their attendance at a meeting to be held January 25, 
1974, at 2:00 o'clock p.m. in the Salt Lake City Com-
mission Chambers. The purpose of the meeting was to 
discuss said proposed improvement district and to hear 
any and all further comments thereon. Further, notice 
of said meeting and its time, place and topic for discus-
sion was published in the Deseret News on January 21, 
1974. (Affidavit of Mayor Jake Garn, R-35, R-39). 
8. On or about January 22, 1974, tabulation of the 
protest showed that protests representing substantially 
less than two-thirds of the property to be assesed had 
been received; to-wit: 49.15% of those protests of record 
property owners, or if, three questionable protests were 
counted, 51.23%. (R-35, 36). 
9. On January 25, 1974, the previously announced 
meeting was held in the Salt Lake City Commission 
Chambers. This meeting was a continuation of the 
previous January 17, 1974 hearing and was held as per 
the Notice mailed January 18, 1974. Further, there 
was wide public publicity of the said January 25, 1974 
meeting in the public news media. There were more 
persons present at this meeting than were present at 
the January 17, 1974 meeting. A full discussion was 
6 
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had before the Board of Salt Lake City Commissioners, 
wherein all who desired to speak were given opportunity 
to speak against or for the proposal. All of the plain-
tiff-appellants received notice of this January 25, 1974 
meeting and all were either present in person or repre-
sented at this meeting. (Deposition of Mayor Jake 
Gam at p. 27; Affidavit of Mayor Jake Garn, R-36); 
Stipulation of Facts, R-55). 
10. After said meeting of January 25, 1974, num-
erous previous protesters withdrew their protests and if 
these withdrawals are considered, the percentage of those 
protesting was reduced to 44.4%. (R-152). 
11. On or about February 13, 1974, the Board of 
Salt Lake City Commissioners approved a Notice to 
Contractors requesting the submission of bids, which 
Notice was published in a newspaper having general 
circulation in Salt Lake City, February 14, 1974, and 
solicited bids for an opening March 7, 1974. Further, 
on said date, the Board approved the project plans and 
specifications of the architect, Barton-Aschman. (Find-
ings of Fact No. 1, R-42; Affidavit of City Recorder 
Herman Hogensen, R-52). Said publication date was 
more than fifteen (15) days prior to the date specified 
for the receipt of bids. Said bids were received and 
duly opened and referred to the City Engineer and the 
City Attorney for determination of the lowest respons-
ible bidder. (R-52). 
12. The date of the bid opening was duly post-
7 
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poned, and bids were opened March 21, 1974. Findings 
of Fac t No. 2,11-42). 
13. Two bids were received, both on a "line item" 
basis. Schocker Construction Company bid a total price 
of $4,771,581.95, and Gibbons and Reed Company, $4,-
123,254.15. The Gibbons and Reed bid was $648,327.80 
lower than that of Schocker Construction Company, but 
$1,248,064.40 higher than the %$0%& estimate of $2,-
875,189.75. (Findings of Fac t No. 3, R-42) . 
14. Because of the City's express guarantee to 
the property owners concerning their cost being limited 
to $505 per front foot, and difference between the esti-
mated (and budgeted) amount, and the lowest bid, the 
City, with the assistance of its consulting architects, in-
vestigated the possibility of eliminating some of the 
proposed improvements. (Findings of Fac t No. 6, R-
43) . 
15. I t was determined that the project could be 
brought within the City's budget by making certain 
deletions, that the deletions would have no adverse 
effects on the aesthetics of the project, and that the 
project as modified would have the same general effect 
as originally intended. This determination was based 
upon substantial facts before the City Commission and 
upon the opinion of the consulting architects. (Findings 
of Fac t No. 7 ,R-43) . 
16. In connection with the proposed revisions to 
8 
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the contract, the City caused to be prepared a "Target 
Vitality" summary sheet, dated April 4, 1974, which 
contained possible revisions to the lowest base bid which, 
as therein summarized, would reduce the cost from $4,-
123,254.15 to $2,834,766.21. (Findings of Fact No. 8, 
R-43). 
17. On April 9, 1974, a notice of a meeting to be 
held April 16, 1974, in Salt Lake City Commission 
Chembers was mailed, postage prepaid, to each of the 
property owners within the district. (Affidavit of 
Mayor Jake Garn, R-37). 
18. Thereafter, on April 16, 1974, an informal 
public meeting was held, notice of the meeting having 
been given and all affected property owners having 
been invited to attend. A summary of the proposed 
changes were distributed, which summary was patterned 
after a "Target Vitality" summary and showed a re-
duction in cost of $2,764,536.21. All members of the 
City Commission attended the meeting, and all persons 
desiring to be heard were heard, but no formal action 
was taken. (Findings of Fact No. 12, R-44). 
19. The adjusted bid of Gibbons and Reed Com-
pany as computed by the City was below the engineer's 
preliminary estimate of $2,875,189.75, and below a sim-
ilarly adjusted bid of Schocker Construction Company, 
City Engineer Fenton recommended to the Board of 
City Commissioners that the contract be awarded to 
Gibbons and Reed Company on the basis of the ad-
justed bid. 
9 
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20. The "adjusted bid with deletions" of Gibbons 
and Reed Company was arrived at in the following 
manner: 
Base Bid $4,123,254.15 
Less deletions: 
Traffic obelisks $357,200.00 
Tree Guards 84,136.00 
Thick set pavers at 
intersections 389,061.45 
7" concrete bed . 64,700.00 
Replacement of sus-
pended system in-
cluding hatch covers 
with grouted paving 
system 191,441.24 
Storm Sewer 202,534.50 
1,289,073.19 
Adjusted Bid 2,834,180.96 
(Findings of Fact No. 14, R-45). 
21. Because of the deletions that would be re-
quired in the contract, and the necessity of substitution 
of some other work as a result of the deletions, the City 
gave consideration to the possibility of rejecting both 
of the bids and readvertising the contract. Readvertis-
ing for new bids would not have been practicable and 
probably would have led to increased costs for the pro-
ject inasmuch as the bidders would be expected to use 
10 
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the July costs rather than the February costs, during 
a period of rapidly accelerating inflation in the con-
struction industry; the contractors had been given a 
sufficient time to determine their costs accurately and 
the experience of the City had been that re-bidding of 
such a contract, under similar circumstances had never 
led a reduction in bid prices. (Findings of Fact No. 
15, R-46). 
22. The plans and specifications of the contract 
required that the pre-cast concrete pavers for the side-
walks to be the product of a manufacturer who was a 
licensee of Schokbeton, or comparable thereto. The 
only Schokbeton licensee in Utah or Idaho was Otto 
Buehner Company of Salt Lake City. Both Schocker 
Construction Company and Gibbons and Reed Com-
pany had received paver subcontract bids only from 
Otto Buehner Company and had based their bid prices 
thereon. Otto Buehner Company was the only sub-
contractor who could practicably supply the concrete 
pavers, and its price for such pavers would have been 
the same to any prime contractor bidding on the pro-
ject. (Findings of Fact No. 16, R-46). 
23. On or about July 2, 1974, the City issued an 
"Order for Extra Work" signed by the City Engineer, 
which directed Gibbons and Reed Company to do cer-
tain work "pursuant to" section 1 of the contract of 
June 12, 1974. The extra work so ordered was as fol-
lows : 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Description of Work Value 
Shallow drainage system $14,725.00 
Roof drain adjustments $ 2,400.00 
Fire alarm pedestals $ 1,589.00 
TOTAL $18,714.00 
(Findings of Fact No. 29, R-50). 
24. I t was important for the City to award the 
contract on the basis of the bids previously submitted 
because if new bids were sought, the first phase of the 
project, between South Temple Street and First South 
Street, could not be completed by the scheduled date, 
and delayed completion would have a substantial ad-
verse effect upon the businesses of the property own-
ers along that section of Main Street. (Findings of 
Fact No. 17,R-46, 47). 
25. On June 12, 1974, after advice had been given 
by the Salt Lake City Attorney and by the City's 
bonding counsel, that a contract could be entered into 
without readvertising, a contract was executed between 
Salt Lake City and Gibbons and Reed Company at the 
agreed price of the adjusted bid as shown in Statement 
of Fact No. 20 above. (Findings of Fact No. 18 R-47). 
26. The contract, as awarded on June 12, 1974, 
deleted in their entirety the traffic obelisks, tree guards, 
thickset pavers at the intersections, seven-inch concrete 
underlayment (6470 square yards), and the storm sewer 
system included in the original plans and specifications. 
(Findings of Fact No. 20, R-47). 
12 
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27. At the time Gibbons and Reed Company and 
the City entered into the contract on June 12, 1974, the 
folbwing changes with their costs, were contemplated by 
the contracting parties: 
Grout System $540,789.02 
Asphalt Paving at 
Intersections $ 41,180.00 
Drainage System $ 22,786.00 
(Findings of Fact No. 22, R-48). 
28. Because of these deletions, completion of the 
project required some minor additions to the contract. 
Deletion of the storm sewer from the system necessitated 
installation of a shallow drainage system; and elimin-
ation of the suspended sidewalk system, permitted the 
use of non-reinforced sidewalk pavers which were thin-
ner and smaller in dimension. (Findings of Fact No. 
21,R-47). 
29. Although the "grout system" was not shown 
as such in the line items, the contract price included 
what was intended to be the cost of the system. (Find-
ings of Fact No. 23, R-48). 
30. Replacement of the sidewalk suspension sys-
tem with a grout system resulted in a net reduction in 
cost of $191,441.24, which is the difference between the 
line items comprising the suspension system totaling 
$731,434.50, as originally bid, and the cost of the side-
13 
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walk system as shown in the line items of the adjusted 
bid. (Findingsof FactNo. 24,R-48). 
31. Elimination of the storm sewer system re-
quired the addition of a shallow drainage system, and 
deletion of the thick set pavers at the intersections re-
quired the intersections to be covered with asphalt pav-
ing. Neither of these two additions were included in the 
total contract price of June 12, 1974, but the contract 
did include a unit price for asphalt paving. (Findings 
of Fact No. 25,11-48). 
32. Under date of September 5, 1974, the City and 
Gibbons and Reed Company entered into a Supple-
mental Agreement to bring the line items into conform-
ance with the plans and specifications. The agreement 
provided that line items 205:03 through 205:10 and 
205:18 through 205:23 were stricken from the June 
12, 1974, contract and line items of the descriptions, 
quantities, and prices shown in the September 5, 1974 
agreement were substituted therefor. (Findings of 
Fact No. 26,R-48). 
33. The Supplemental Agreement of September 
5, 1974, resulted in a net increase in the contract price 
of approximately $784.02. All of the grout necessary 
to complete the installation of all pre-cast concrete pav-
ers for the sidewalk system was included in the prices. 
(Findings of Fact No. 27, R-49). 
34. The pavers included in the substituted line 
items as described in the September 5, 1974, agreement 
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were substantially the same type of pavers as were in-
cluded in the June 12, 1974, agreement except that 
some of the pavers were thinner, nonreinforced, and of 
smaller dimensions. Otherwise, the pavers were the 
same. They required the same materials and had to be 
made by the Schockbeton or a comparable process. 
(Findings of Fact No. 28, R-49). 
35. The items in the extra work order of July 2, 
1974, were not included in the original contract but 
were necessaiy in order to complete the project. At 
the time of execution of the original contract on June 
12, 1974, the need for the shallow drainage system was 
known, but the need for roof drain adjustments and 
fire alarm pedestals was not. (Findings of Fact No. 
30, R-50). 
36. Under the plan for the Main Street Improve-
ment Project, the cost of improvements at the inter-
sections is to paid entirely by the City, and the cost of 
the asphalt paving in the intersection will not increase 
the assessment against the property owners within the 
improvement district. (Findings of Fact No. 31, R-50). 
37. On or about July 30, 1974, an extra work order 
was issued for approximately 3,000 tons of sand, at a 
potential cost of $8,250.00. This sand was to be used 
in filling abandoned underground vaults through 1974 
and 1975, as needed. This item had not been included in 
the original contract because of uncertainty as to what 
vaults would have to be filled, but the City Commission 
had gone on record as saying it would pay the cost of 
15 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
sand to be used. Although the estimated cost of the 
work order is $8,250.00, Gibbons and Reed Company 
committed itself to supply sand at a $2.75 per ton price 
for the entire project. This was advantageous to the 
City in that it was able to obtain a fixed price, not sub-
ject to increase during the 1975 phase of construction. 
Only sand actually used need be purchased. (Findings 
of Fact No. 32, R-50, 51). 
38. The major changes made in the contract prior 
to its award to Gibbons and Reed Company consisted 
of the entire elimination of some improvements previous-
ly contemplated. The remaining changes were not sub-
stantial, and were necessitated by the elimination of 
other items. (Findings of Fact No. 34, R-52). 
39. The changes made by the City after advertis-
ing for bids on the project did not substantially change 
the character of the project or increase its cost; they 
were reasonable, were in fulfillment of the original un-
dertaking, and were necessitated by an emergency situ-
ation. (Findings of Fact No. 35, R-52). 
40. In making the changes in the contract, the City 
and Gibbons and Reed Company acted in good faith 
and reasonably under the circumstances. Readvertising 
for new bids on the project would have resulted in in-
creased costs for the construction and an unreasonable 
delay in completion of phase 1 of the project. If the 
readvertising had resulted in costs to the property own-
ers in excess of $505.00 per front foot, additional pro-
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ceedings would have been required under the Municipal 
Improvement District Act. (Findings of Fact No. 36, 
R-52, 53). 
41. The changes made by the City were of the 
type contemplated by the original solicitation for bids 
and by provisions of 10-16-8, Utah Code Annotated 
1953. (Findings of Fact No. 37,R-53). 
42. Errors or irregularities in the manner of 
awarding the contract, if any, e.g., deletion of some of 
the quantities and specified line items, did not go to 
the substance of the contract and did not go to the 
equity or justice of the proceeding. (Findings of Fact 
No. 38,R-53). 
43. Approximately one block of the three block 
project has been completed and there has been no assess-
ment of tax against the property as of this date. (R-90; 
R-580). 
44. Gibbons and Reed has had a long history of 
contracting work within the State of Utah, and specific-
ally, for Salt Lake City Corporation. They have a 
reputation and are known by the City to do high quality 
work at reasonable prices. They are a firm of substan-
tial size, capable of handling this large project, with 
financial means to handle and expedite this matter. Fur-
ther, said firm has expertise in the type of project con-
templated and has, in the past, been an easy firm with 
which the City could deal and correct difficulties as 
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contract work progressed. (Affidavit of City Engineer 
Joseph Fenton, R-89, 91). 
45. The custom and practice of the construction in-
dustry for contractors bidding on state and municipal 
contracts is to have contract clauses which contain pro-
visions for changes and extra work orders. I t is usual 
to have changes in specifications and plans after a con-
tract has been let. The custom and practice in the in-
dustry on such necessary changes is for the government-
al agency and the contractor to agree on a price for the 
additional or extra work, or proceed on a "cost plus" 
basis. These matters are not let for competitive bidding, 
because among other reasons, it would result in con-
fusion, delay and expense by having separate inde-
pendent contractors on the jobs, not under the super-
vision of the general contractor. 
(Testimony of Noel Gold, R-524-527; R-529-530). 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
S P E C I A L I M P R O V E M E N T D I S T R I C T S 
A R E P R E S U M E D TO B E V A L I D A N D T H E 
P R O C E E D I N G S C R E A T I N G T H E M A R E 
P R E S U M E D R E G U L A R ; F U R T H E R , I T IS 
P R E S U M E D T H A T M U N I C I P A L A U T H O R -
I T I E S COMPLY W I T H T H E L A W AND 
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THEY EXERCISE THEIR POWERS IN A 
LEGAL AND LAWFUL MANNER. THE 
BURDEN OF PROOF IS ON THE CHAL-
LENGER. 
The creation of a special improvement district pur-
suant to state law is an exercise of legislative power 
having its origin in the taxing power. As such, the 
court's power to review is limited. This point is clearly-
made by our sister state of New Mexico when it stated: 
" 'A city council in establishing a sewer dist-
rict and determining its boundaries, is exercis-
ing a legislative power, having its orgin in the 
taxing power/ " Feldhake v. City of Sante Fe, 
300 P. 2d 934, 939 (New Mexico, 1956), citing 
Wolff v. City of Denver, 77 Pac. 364. (Other 
citations omitted) 
The court further noted from McQuillin: 
" 'I t has been uniformly held that the ac-
tion of the municipal legislature, in the pursu-
ance of statutory or charter powers, in establish-
ing a district to be benefited by local public im-
provements so as to justify a special assessment 
against property lying within the district, is a 
legislative act which is conclusive in the absence 
of any evidence that it mas procured by fraud, 
or proof that it is manifestly arbitrary or unrea-
sonable, or that the assessment is palpably un-
just and apressive. Accordingly, the power of 
review of the courts is limited.' " Feldhake v. 
City of Sante Fe, id at p. 939, quoting 14 Mc-
Quillin, Municipal Corporations, S38.47 at p. 
157. (Emphasis added) 
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This court further correctly noted: 
"These propositions of law existing, the 
burden of proof as to fraud or arbitrary conduct 
equivalent to fraud necessarily rests upon him 
who makes an attack upon the action of the city 
in determining that a municipal improvement 
district shall be established," Feldhake v. City of 
Sante Fe, id. at p. 939. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, in view of the presumption of validity and 
the limited power of review by the court, the district 
under attack must be presumed to be valid. The burden 
of proof is upon the challengers to establish those ele-
ments. See also, City Jacksonville v. Dorwart, 164 N.E. 
129 (111. 1928); Wiget v. City of St. Louis, 85 S.W. 
2d 1038 (Mo. 1935); Peicke v. Covington, 249 S.W. 
1008 (Ky. 1923) ; 63 CJS Mun. Corp. §1137. 
In Point I of the plaintiff-appellant's brief, they 
attempt to give this court the impression that the City 
had a binding pohcy of the City Commission not to 
approve a special improvement district, if there were 
more than 50% opposed to it. The record contradicts 
that implication. Regarding this subject, the testimony 
of Mayor Garn in his deposition is as follows: 
"Q. So this is just a touchstone, if I may 
use that phraseology, in determining whether 
you would or would not approve, but not neces-
sarily binding on yourself or any other commis-
sioner, is that correct? 
A. No. It's absolutely not binding. It's a 
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feeling we have and we follow. But as to Mr. 
Roe's question, it is not an ordinance and cer-
tainly not binding on us collectively or/individ-
ually. 
Q. Well, I'm just saying would three votes 
have made any difference even though you're 
talking about 49 percent or 51 percent opposed? 
A. If the final tabulation, as far as I am per-
sonally concerned, would have ended up with the 
majority protesting, my personal vote would 
have been against the project. 
Q. But that wouldn't have been binding on the 
other commissioners. 
A. No, absolutely not, any more than any 
other issue that comes up. I think it is important 
Roger, if you just permit me for a minute on that 
meeting on January the 25th. Even though I 
personally, and again my own personal opinion, 
had made a public statement that I would vote 
with the majority, and I still stand by that and 
that is my personal policy, when the vote was so 
close against indicating 50.85 percent in favor. 
And I said to the commission, I said, even though 
I have made a commitment, I will not vote to 
approve that project with such a slim margin 
until we've had an opportunity to go through 
with the hearing that I had promised the pro-
perty owners. So let's take it under advisement." 
(Deposition of Mayor Jake Garn, at p. 48-49.) 
Further, the statement of plaintiff-appellants that 
they have in some manner been prejudiced by detri-
mental reliance is entirely unsupported by the evidence. 
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The undisputed facts show that each of the property 
owners received actual notice of the meetings and had 
the opportunity to present protests. The plaintiff-ap-
pellants have admitted that they individually received 
acual notice of every meeting held and have admitted 
they were either personally present at the meetings or 
were represented. 
At no time has any evidence been presented that 
any property owner entitled to file a protest did not file 
if he desired, or was diimaded from filing because of 
the alleged City 50% protest policy. In fact, over the 
entire length of these proceedings, no one has even sug-
gested the name of any property owner entitled to file 
a dissent was dis^iaded from doing so. Rather, plaintiff-
appellants make the naked assertion that somehow they 
detrimentally relied on statements of the Commmission-
ers without one scintilla of evidence to meet their burden 
of proof on this issue. 
Utah law regarding the filing of a dissent as ap-
plicable to this special improvement district is clear and 
unequivocal. I t states: 
"For purposes of this section, the necessary 
number of protests shall mean the aggregate of 
the following: 
(a) Protests representing two-thirds of the 
property to be assessed in cases where an assess-
ment is proposed to be made according to front-
age, or 
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( b ) . . . 
(c) . . . 
If less than the necessary number of protests 
are filed by the owners of the property to be as-
sessed, the governing body shall have jurisdiction 
to create the special improvement district and 
proceed with the making of the improvements" 
10-16-7(3). Utah Code Ann. 1953 (Replace-
ment Volume 2A). (Emphasis added) 
Thus, not only has the plaintiff-appelbnt failed to meet 
his burden of proof, but the statute clearly precludes 
their assertion. 
However, even accepting arguendo that the City is 
somehow bound, contrary to the provisions of Utah law 
to a 50 percent test, the facts clearly show that this test 
has been met. The law specifically permits the with-
drawal of protests during this hearing and evaluation 
period. I t states that in computing the percentage of 
protesters, the municipality shall not count: 
". . . (i) Protests relating to property or re-
lating to a type of improvement which has been 
deleted from the district, and (ii) Protests which 
have been withdrawn in writing prior to the con-
clusion of the hearing." 10-16-7(3), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, (Replacement Vol. 2A). Em-
phasis added. 
The facts are undisputed that the meeting scheduled 
in the notice of protest was duly held January 17, 1974. 
This meeting was continued until January 25, 1974, 
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pursuant to written notice of all of the property owners 
concerned with this district. Thus, contrary to the as-
sertion of the plaintiff-appellants in their brief the law 
specifically permits the withdrawing of protests and 
appellants citation of 1895 and 1929 cases can hardly 
amend language of a 1969 statute. 
Further, in view of the clear statutory provision 
fixing the protesters at two-thirds, the City commission 
cannot be barred from considering the withdrawal of 
two protests and thus, reducing those protesting or 
opposed to the district to 44.4%, regardless of the time 
when withdrawn. The rule of thumb of some commis-
sioners that they would personally not vote for a dis-
trict, if more than fifty percent opposed it, as a legisla-
tive policy question, should not be codified into law by 
judicial fiat, as requested by appellants. Rather, these 
are political decisions for which the commissioners were 
elected to make and for which they are responsible to 
the electorate. If they choose in that political decision 
making process not to consider protests which have been 
withdrawn they are well within their statutory power 
and may approve or disapprove the project. That is 
exclusively a political and not a judicial decision. 
Thus, under any count of the protesters, the board 
acted entirely within the scope of its statutory authority 
and exercised its political discretionary powers vested 
by state statute in approving the special improvement 
district. The decision of Judge Croft affirming their 
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right under the law to make decision should not be dis-
turbed by this court. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E C R E A T I O N O F A S P E C I A L IM-
P R O V E M E N T D I S T R I C T BY A U T A H C I T Y 
IS A U T H O R I Z E D BY S T A T E L A W . COMPLI-
ANCE W I T H T H E P R O V I S I O N S OF S T A T E 
L A W IS TO BE J U D G E D BY A S T A N D A R D 
O F " S U B S T A N T I A L " C O M P L I A N C E A N D 
M E R E I R R E G U L A R I T I E S W I L L NOT VOID 
T H E D I S T R I C T . 
A. Substantial Compliance. 
This court has stated what standards are to be ap-
plied in determining the compliance with statutory re-
quirements for creation of a special improvement dis-
trict. I t has said: 
". . . (T)he courts generally hold that the 
giving of such notice (Notice of Intention to 
create a district) is jurisdictional, and must be 
substantially complied^ml/n order to authorize a 
levy of an assessment. 4 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, §1849-1852 . . . (Other citations 
omitted) The diversity among the decisions is 
not with respect to giving notice, but there is 
a marked difference among thcm with respect to 
the sufficiency of the notice where notice is 
given." Jones v. Foulger, 46 U. 419, 150 P . 933 
(1915). (Emphasis added). 
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This observation was cited with approval in a 1974 
decision of this court. In voiding a district for the total 
failure of Kanab City to provide for a Board of Equal-
ization and Review, the court stated: 
" . . . Failure of the City to substantially comply 
with the statutes pertaining to the giving of notice 
are jurisdictional." Lewis v. Kanab City, -U.2d-, 
523*P.2d417, 418 (1974). 
Thus, the City need not "strictly" meet all statu-
tory requirements of the creation of an improvement 
district on pain of running the gauntlet of a jurisdiction 
defect and dismissal. Rather, a special improvement is 
valid if it "substantially" complies with the enabling 
legislation and a technical defect will not be grounds 
for judicially declaring it void. 
B. The Notice of Intention of this Special Im-
provement District. 
The Notice of Intention of this special improve-
ment district complies with state law by generally de-
scribing the improvements to be made and stating the 
purpose for its creation. * 
In the case before the bar, there is no question that 
the Notice was given or that it was published as re-
quired by law; rather, the plaintiff-appellants have 
challenged only the sufficiency of the Notice of In-
tention. In this challenge they state that the published 
notice did not: 
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1. State the "purpose'1 for which the assess-
ments were made; 
2. Describe the improvements to be made; 
3. Advise abutting property owners and the 
citizens of Salt Lake in general, that streets 
would be narrowed and the grade changed; and 
4.Give notice that traffic pattern on Main 
Street would be changed. (Point I I of plaintiff-
appellants Brief). 
A reading of the Notice and applicable Utah statutes 
answers these challenges clearly. 
Section 10-16-4 of the Utah Code states that special 
improvement districts may be created, among other 
things therein listed, to: (1) Establish, open, extend 
and widen any street or sidewalk; (2) Install sewers, 
drains or parks; (3) Construct bridges or street light-
ing; (4) Cover or fence reservoirs, canals, ditches or 
other water facilities; (5) Acquire and maintain park-
ing lots; and (6) Construct recreational facilities and 
parks. See, 10-16-4, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended in 1969. This section also specifically pro-
vides that special improvement districts and tax assess-
ments may be levied to pay for any such improvement; 
it states: 
"For the purpose of making or paying for all 
or a part of the cost of any such improvements 
. . ., the governing body of a municipality may 
. . . levy assessments on the property within such 
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a district. . . . "10-16-4(2),- Utah Code Ann. 
1953. 
The statute regarding Notice of Intention only requires 
that the municipality state what improvements are to be 
made in a "general way." I t provides that the notice: 
"In a general way, describe the improvements 
proposed to be made showing the places the im-
provements are proposed to be made and the 
general nature of the improvements." 10-16-5 (1) 
(d), Utah Code Ann, 1953; cf. 10-16-5 (a), 
which says they will also state the "purpose" for 
tax assessments. (Emphasis added). 
I t is submitted that these three sections must be 
read together. Certainly the legislative merely intended 
that the property owners be apprised in a "general way" 
of the improvements proposed and be advised of the 
"purpose" for the assessment; that is, that the assess-
ment is to do curb and gutter type of work and not to 
purchase land for a park, building a water reservoir or 
some other authorized project. This statutory construc-
tion seems certain since the legislature did not require 
a statement of "purposes." Obviously, there are many 
collateral and subjective types of purposes in any con-
struction projects and not all of these need be published 
under law. Further, the legislature seems to have gone 
out of its way to make it abundantly clear, by stating 
the improvements need only be described in a "general 
way," that specifics need not be made a part of the 
notice. Certainly plaintiff-appellants citing of cases 
dating 50 years before this law was passed have no 
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precedent value on that issue. 
Rather, Utah case decisions rendered after the 
Municipal Improvement District Act of 1969 was 
passed have sustained this interpretation of a general 
type notice. The most recent decision is the 1971 case 
of Dawson v. Swapp, 26 Ut.2d 250, 487 P.2d 1288 
(1971). Like the case before the bar, the plaintiff there 
attempted to challenge the sufficiency of the Notice of 
Intention; he charged that it failed to state: 
a. All of the purposes of the project in the 
Notice of Intent, i.e., the purchase of land; and 
b. A general description of the work to be 
done. 
In this Swapp case, the notice described the improve-
ments as consisting: 
" . . . of the necessary grading and construction 
or reconstruction of the curbs, gutters, drive-
ways, sidewalks and other appurtenant facilities 
and works." Dawson v. Swapp, id. at p. 1289. 
This court observed that the lower court judge: 
" . . . found that the notice of intention and its 
publication fully complied with the statutory re-
quirements and that sufficient notice was furnish-
ed to all interested persons of the intention to 
create the district and the improvements intended 
to be made." Dawson v. Swapp, id. at p. 1289. 
That lower court holding was not disturbed by the court 
and it affirmed the dismissal by Judge Gould of the 
challengers action. 
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In the case before the Bar, Salt Lake City, Notice 
of Intention is virtually identical to the Swapp case. 
I t described the purpose and the improvements to be 
made in a general way by stating that the proposed 
improvement district was : 
"To remove all existing curbs, gutters, side-
walks and street paving and construct new street 
paving, pedestrian paving, landscape structure, 
planters and planting, curb and gutters, together 
with new street lighting and drainage structures, 
and do all the work necessary to complete the 
project in accordance with Salt Lake City stand-
ards." 
"All other necessary things shall be done to 
complete the whole project in a proper and 
workmanlike manner according to the plans, 
profiles and specifications on file with the Salt 
Lake City Engineer . . ." Statement of Fact No. 
3 and Appendix 1. 
Further on file with the City Engineer were the 
plans and profiles and specifications which showed 
the details of the project in the notice. I t showed the 
grade changes, the change in vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic patterns and the change in space allocations for 
pedestrian and vehicular traffic. (Affidavit of City 
Engineer Joseph Fenton, R-84). Our sister state Idaho 
specifically approved this incorporation by reference to 
augment a notice of intention to create a special im-
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provement district. In the case of Dement v. City of 
Caldwell, the Idaho court upheld plans incorporated by 
reference and held: 
" . . . the reference to the plans and specifica-
tions is sufficient to give notice to all parties 
interested in the general character of the pro-
posed works." Dement v. City of Caldwell, 125 
P . 200, 202 (Ida. 1912) ; see also 13 McQuillin, 
Municipal Corporation, §37.85 and therein 
cited. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that even if one 
accepts arguendo, plaintiff-appellants position that the 
Notice should have been more specific, the incorporation 
by reference of the detailed plans gave all notice of the 
details of this proposed improvement district. The 
statute regarding notice has been more than "substan-
tially" complied with by the City and the district is 
valid. 
The only known case to the writer which has lan-
guage which could possibly be construed to support the 
appellants position that the Notice of Intention of Salt 
Lake City was not sufficient, is a 1917 case of Gwilliam 
v. Ogden City, 49 Ut. 555, 164 P. 1022 (1917). How-
ever that case is distinguishable because the plans were 
not incorporated by reference. Further, with regard 
to the notice requirement, that case was based on Sec-
tion 273 of the Laws in force in 1917; and that section 
of Utah law has long ago been repealed. In fact, the 
1969 State Legislature passed a Comprehensive Muni-
cipal Improvement District Act, which Act as a whole, 
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shows that the publications are for the purpose of giv-
ing property owners notice of the project, not in spec-
ifics, but in a "general" way. The change in the lan-
guage specifically by inserting "general way" make£ 
the Gwilliam holding on this point of no precedent value. 
Obviously, under the present law, the notices of inten-
tion are not intended to be published in book form. 
The Notice of Intention in the case before the bar 
certainly meets this legislative intent and "substantially" 
complies with state law. Further, the challengers have 
not shown any prejudice and have not even alleged 
that anyone in the district was, in fact, unaware of: 
(a) The grade change of less than one foot; (b) The 
elimination of one traffic lane to make Main Street 
have two vehicle traffic lanes in each direction, instead 
of two in one and three in another; and (c) The alter-
ation of some vehicular traffic patterns by preventing 
Main Street from being a thoroughfare to Davis County 
over Victory Road. 
I t is respectfully submitted that the Notice is valid 
within the meaning of the 1969 Municipal District Act 
and this court should so find. 
P O I N T I I I 
A S T R E E T IS T H A T A R E A B E T W E E N 
P R O P E R T Y L I N E S AND I N C L U D E S SIDE-
W A L K S A N D SPACE FOR V E H I C U L A R 
T R A F F I C . AS SUCH, T H E R E IS NO N E E D TO 
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PASS AN ORDINANCE WHEN THE CITY 
CHOOSES TO CHANGE THE ALLOCATION 
OF SPACE BETWEEN VEHICULAR AND 
PEDESTRIAN TRAFFIC ON SALT LAKE 
CITY STREETS. 
Plaintiff-appellants have assigned as error the al-
leged failure of the City to pass an ordinance narrow-
ing a street as required by Section 10-8-8.2, Utah Code 
Ann. 1953, as amended. This statute provides as fol-
lows : 
"When in the opinion of the governing body 
of the city there is good cause for vacating, or 
narrowing a street or alley, or any part thereof, 
and that such vacation or narrowing will not be 
detrimental to the general interest, it may, by 
ordinance, and without petition therefor, vacate 
or narrow such street or alley or any part there-
of." 
Significantly, Section 10-8-8.5, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
provides that when the street has been narrowed by or-
dinance, that action shall constitute a relinquishment 
of the City's ownership therein. The statute provides: 
"The action of the governing body vacating or 
narrowing a street . . . which has been dedicated 
to public use by a proprietor, shall operate to the 
extent to which it is vacated or narrowed, . . . 
as a revocation of the acceptance thereof and the 
city's relinquishment of the city's fee therein by 
the governing body. . . ." (Emphasis added). 
Thus, the statutes are clear if a street is narrowed 
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or vacated by ordinance as permitted by Utah statutes, 
to the degree that the street is narrowed or vacated, the 
ownership and rights of the City to that property is 
abandoned and vacated. Obviously, the intent of the 
legislature was not to require that whenever a muni-
cipality chose to allocate portions of this right-of-way 
to vehicular or pedestrian traffic, that it must pass an 
ordinance and thereby lose ownership thereof. This is 
the result that would accompany the logic propounded 
by the plaintiff-appellants in their brief. 
Rather, Utah law is clear that the word "street" 
contemplates the full area between abutting property 
lines. This point was made clear early by the Utah 
Court in the case of Davidson v. Utah Independent 
Telephone Co., 34 U. 249, 197 P . 124, 125 (1908). 
Here, in rejecting the claim that the word "street" 
meant only area used for vehicular traffic, the court 
stated: 
"The word 'street', 'as commonly used and un-
derstood' means a highway in a town or city 
used for the public for travel either by means of 
vehicles or on foot, and embraces all of the areas 
between the lots on either side." (Emphasis add-
ed) (Citations omitted) See also, Salt Lake City 
V. Schubach, 108 U. 266, 159 P. 2d 149 (1945)'; 
Stringham v. Salt Lake City, 114 U. 517 201 P. 
2d 758 (1949) ; Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 U. 
2d 27, 492 P . 2d 1335 (1972), City of Holden-
vtfle v. Talley, 240 P. 2d 761 (Okl. 1952), cited 
with approval in Gallegos v. Midvale City. 
Thus, it is clear and obvious that City has not nar-
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rowed the "street"; rather, it has merely changed the 
space allocations for vehicular and pedestrian traffic. 
It has not narrowed the street within the meaning of 
10-8-8.2. Therefore, no passage of an ordinance is re-
quired. 
Further, contrary to the assertion of the plaintiff-
appellants, the lower court did not find the "street" 
narrowed. The memorandum decision of Judge Croft, 
referred to by the plaintiff-appellants in Point I I of 
their brief, constituted a partial granting of defendant-
respondents motion for a summary judgment. His 
statement in that decision referring to undisputed facts 
that one lane of the then five lane Main Street was elim-
inated and that space allocated to sidewalk area; two 
lanes of vehicular traffic in both dired^f^were and are 
to remain. To suggest that the lower court made a find-
ing of fact on conflicting evidence in that summary 
judgment proceeding is ludicrous. (See, the Plans en-
tered as Exhibits T3-D and T4-D and the testimony of 
Mayor Jake Garn at Deposition p. 28; cf. Memoran-
dum Decision of Judge Croft in which he specifically 
held that Section 10-8-8.2 could not create a jurisdic-
tional defect in the Municipal Improvement District 
Act, R-285; cf. R-290). 
However, even accepting arguendo, the position 
of the plaintiff-appellants that a City ordinance should 
have been passed, it does not follow, as was specifically 
held by Judge Croft, that the provisions of Section 10-
8-8.2, Utah Code Ann. is a jurisdictional element for 
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creation of a special improvement district. I t will be 
noted that the aforesaid section of the Utah Code is not 
within the Municipal Improvement District Act and 
cannot possibly be construed to be a jurisdiction re-
quirement thereof. In fact, the said Municipal Im-
provement District Act specifically provides that it: 
". . . shall constitute full authority for the 
making of improvements, creations of special 
improvement district, levying of assessments, 
and the issuance of special improvement bonds 
by municipalities." 10-16-38, Utah Code Ann. 
1953, as amended. 
The failure to pass such an ordinance provided in 
Chapter 8 could not be considered jurisdictional to void 
the improvement district created under the provisions 
of Chapter 16, when it is expressly stated to be self ex-
ecuting. 
In addition, it is important to note that Utah law 
grants to the cities the unbridled power and discretion 
to lay out, establish, alter, widen or narrow streets and 
sidewalks. The statute provides as follows: 
"They may lay out, establish, open, alter, wid-
en, narrow, extend, grade, pave . . . streets . . . 
sidewalks . . ." 10-8-8, Utah Code Ann. 1953, 
as amended. (Emphasis added) 
Thus, the City has broad power and right to allocate 
right-of-way areas between vehicular and pedestrian 
traffic. There is no requirement that there be any 
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notice whatsoever given for this exercise of city pre-
rogatives in managing the streets. 
Further, Utah law is clear that property owners 
have no vested right in traffic flow. The cases are con-
sistent and uniform in their holding; a representative 
case states as follows: 
"It is settled in this jurisdiction that the land 
owner has no property right in the flow of traf-
fic on a public highway." Utah Road Commis-
sion v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 304, 393 P . 2d 917 
(1963) and cases therein cited; see also, Town 
or State v. Roselli, 101 U. 464, 120 P . 2d 276; 
Springville Banking Co. v. Barton, 10 U. 2d 349 
P. 2d 157; Robinette v. Price, 74 U. 512, 280 P . 
2d 736. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that this court 
should affirm the lower court's ruling that the special 
improvement district is not void or defective because it 
altered space allocations between vehicular and pedes-
trian traffic on Main Street. The abutting property 
owners have no vested right to traffic patterns of a 
street. The street has not been narrowed; rather, 
space allocations between vehicular and pedestrian traf-
fic have merely been altered as permitted by law. Fur-
ther, the passage or failure to pass a city ordinance re-
lating to an alleged street narrowing is not a jurisdic-
tional element for the creation of a special improvement 
district. 
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P O I N T IV 
E V E N A C C E P T I N G A R G U E N D O T H A T 
T H E N O T I C E OF I N T E N T I O N TO C R E A T E 
A D I S T R I C T W A S D E F E C T I V E I N SOME 
J U R I S D I C T I O N A L A S P E C T , T H A T D E F E C T 
DOES NOT VOID T H E D I S T R I C T ; R A T H E R , 
E Q U I T Y R E Q U I R E S T H A T T H E D I S T R I C T 
AND T H E T A X BE H E L D V A L I D SO F A R AS 
T H E C H A L L E N G E R S H A V E B E E N B E N E -
F I X E D AND TO T H E E X T E N T T H E C I T Y 
H A S NOT E X C E E D E D I T S A U T H O R I T Y . 
I t is well settled law in the State of Utah that even 
an improvement district has been created with jurisdic-
tion*^defects, the entire district is not voided. Rather, 
only those portions which exceed the City authority are 
invalidated. 
The principle case concerning this subject, con-
cerned the creation of a curb and gutter district which 
plaintiff-appellants challenged on the ground that the 
Notice of Intention failed to: 
a. State the purpose for which the taxes would 
be levied; and 
b. Describe the proposed improvements which 
were contemplated. 
This court observed: 
"The law is well settled that, if what the city 
does merely amounts to an irregularity, either in 
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publishing notice or in letting contracts, or in 
their execution, etc., the assessment of tax im-
posed to defray the cost of the improvement can-
not be collaterally assailed in equity or otherwise. 
If, however, what the city does or omits to do 
affects its power or jurisdiction to make the pro-
posed improvement, that is, if the publication of 
the notice is jurisdictional, and the city in pub-
lishing said notice does not comply with the re-
quirements of the law, and, for that reason, does 
not acquire jurisdiction to order or to make the 
proposed improvement and to levy the special 
tax to defray the cost thereof upon the abutting 
property, the the tax may be collaterally assailed 
at any time." GwilHam v. Ogden City, 49 U. 
555, 164 P. 1022, 1024 (1917). 
Thereafter the court reasoned that the Notice of Inten-
tion of Ogden City failed to meet the requirements im-
posed by Section 273 of the Law of Utah 1917 and 
stated: 
"In all the foregoing cases this court held that 
the things required of the city by Sec. 273 (not-
ice of intention) are jurisdictional, and unless 
they are complied with with reasonable strict-
ness the city authorities are without power or jur-
isdiction to impose a special assessment or tax to 
defray the cost of the proposed improvement." 
Gwilliam v. Ogden City, id. at p. 1024. 
However, after so holding that the notice was jurisdic-
tional and was defective, the court refused to void the 
entire district. Rather, it deleted from the tax assess-
ment only that portion concerning street grading, which 
39 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
was not properly made subject of the Notice of Inten-
tion under then existing law. The court specifically 
held: 
"To the extent that the tax is valid and as far 
as it benefited plaintiffs' property equity re-
quires that their property be held to pay the 
same. To the extent that the city has exceeded 
its authority and hence seeks to impose an invalid 
assessment and tax upon plaintiffs' property, 
they should be given relief." Gmlliam v. Ogden 
City, id. at p. 1025. 
Therefore, the court specifically refused to enjoin 
collection of the improvement assessment and held that 
the court in equity would restrain the city only from en-
forcing the invalid portion of the tax; that is, that por-
tion which was not properly made a part of the Notice 
as required by law. 
Another case closely in point is Branting v. Salt 
Lake City, 153 P. 995 (1915). In this case, the Utah 
Supreme Court was asked to rule on an objection to a 
special improvement district which attempted to levy 
an assessment in excess of the Engineer's estimated 
costs published in the Notice of Intention. The com-
plainants argued that had all the property owners been 
aware of the cost, they may have been unwilling to ap-
prove the district and filed timely protests. The court 
acknowledged the possibility but rejected the argument, 
stating that a taxpayer had a duty to file timely pro-
tests. When they did not file protests, they waived their 
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rights to oppose the district; that is, the court apparent-
ly rejected the argument that the entire district must 
be voided for an alleged jurisdictional defect in the 
Notice of Intent. The court stated specifically: 
"Now, they (plaintiffs) say, the taxpayers 
may have been willing to pay the cost of the im-
provement according to the estimate, while they 
may not have been willing to pay for one which 
exceeded the estimated cost. That may be so, 
but that is not the controlling question here. Tax-
payers like all other persons, must take notice of 
and abide by the law. Branting v. Salt Lake 
City, id. at p. 999. (Emphasis added) 
The Municipal Improvement Act of 1969 also con-
templates this result by limiting judicial review. That 
law provides: 
"No assessment or proceeding in a special im-
provement district shall be declared void or set 
aside in whole or in part in consequence of any 
error or irregularity which does not go to the 
equity or justice of the assessment or proceed-
ing. However, any party . . . who has not 
waived his objections thereto (by failure to file 
protest or object) . . . shall have the right to 
commence a civil action against the municipality 
to enjoin the levy or collection of the assessment 
or to set aside and declare unlawful the proceed-
ings." 
"(2) . . . Such action shall be the exclusive 
remedy of any aggrieved, party. No court shall 
entertain any complaint which the party was 
authorized to make, but did not make in a pro-
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test filed pursuant to Section 10-16-7 or at hear-
ings held pursuant to Section 10-16-17, or any 
complaint that does not go to the equity or justice 
of the assessment or proceeding " 10-16-28 (1) 
(2), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended. (Em-
phasis added) 
I t is respectfully submitted that this observation 
is the reason why this Court in 1971 ruled that it was 
premature to commence an action prior to the time that 
an actual tax assessment had been made. Only that 
portion of the tax illegally assessed may be challenged 
and only those persons who properly filed protests or 
objections may so object. See, Dawson v. Swapp, sup-
ra. Thus, the law in Utah is clear that j urisdictional de-
fects may only be asserted by those who have properly 
filed protests. Further, only those particular defects 
must be deleted from the project's tax assessment. 
In the case before the Bar, even if one accepts the 
entire position of plaintiff-appellants that the Notice of 
Intention was defective for failure to notify the land-
owners of the grade change and the others mentioned, 
the only remedy would be to delete the proportionate 
cost thereof from the protestor's tax assessments. Those 
sums deleted would be paid by the City. On this point, 
the Municipal Improvement District Act states: 
"If any property shall be illegally assessed 
. . . the municipality so assessing such property 
shall be liable to the holder of the special im-
provement bond issuing against the funds cre-
ated by such assessments, which amount shall be 
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paid from the general fund of the municipality." 
10-16-29 (2), Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amend-
ed. 
This statutory provision follows former case law 
statements. In Ryberg v. Lundstrom, 70 U. 517, 261 
P. 453 (1927), the court refused to grant a writ of man-
damus to compel the city to levy an assessment after a 
special improvement district was held void for failure 
to establish a Board of Equalization. The court held 
that extraordinary relief was not available because the 
City was required to pay the contractor from the gen-
eral fund and that it was legal for the city to make an 
additional assessment in substitute for the illegal one. 
Virtually identical to that result was the case of Booth 
v. Midvale City, 184 P. 799 (1919) In this case, the 
court refused to grant a writ of prohibition to restrain 
the city from paying the cost of repaving a road. In 
that case, the complainant urged that the city lacked 
power to improve a road without establishing a special 
improvement district to assess the cost to abutting land-
owners. The court rejected this argument and held 
that the city had authority to contract the work under 
other powers and it was, therefore, authorized to pay for 
the roadway improvements from the general fund for 
the work performed. 
Thus, it is respectfully submitted that the law in 
Utah is clear in that only those portions of an improve-
ment district which are not properly part of the district 
are exempt from a tax levy under that district. Further, 
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only those persons filing proper protest may object to 
assessments levied against their property. Those im-
provements which are held not to be properly part of the 
district will be paid for by the city from its general 
fund. Further, even if the plaintiff-appellants position 
were accepted, the court is not in a position to make a 
determination of what portions of the project shall be 
assumed by the city, until after a tax levy and assess-
ment has been made. Therefore, the Improvement Dis-
trict should be upheld. 
P O I N T V 
T H E P L A I N T I F F - A P P E L L A N T S OR-
D E R TO S H O W CAUSE C A L L E D A N "AL-
T E R N A T I V E W R I T OF P R O H I B I T I O N " I N 
CASE NO. 221266, F A I L E D TO COMPLY 
W I T H T H E P R O V I S I O N S OF R U L E 65 O F 
T H E U T A H R U L E S O F CIVIL P R O C E D U R E 
A N D W A S P R O P E R L Y S E T A S I D E A N D 
D E N I E D BY T H E L O W E R COURT. 
Point IV of plaintiff-appellants brief is essen-
tially a red herring; however, a short response will 
be made to avoid confusion of the jfcrmam issues of this 
case. 
The facts that show that the plaintiff-appellants 
filed an action under Third District Court Case No. 
220475, on or about June 20, 1974. Thereafter, on July 
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31, 1974 the plaintiff-appellants filed a pleading under 
case number 221266, alleging virtually identical facts. 
In the latter action, they prayed for a temporary re-
straining order which they called an "Alternate Writ of 
Prohibition" and had the same executed ex parte by 
Judge Marcellus f. Snow on July 31, 1974. Said order, 
issued without prior notice to the City, enjoined the 
City from further work on the Main Street project and 
set-up a hearing date when said order would become 
final. I t specifically stated: 
"You are further commanded to show cause 
before this court at 2:00 p.m. on the 15th day of 
August, 1974, or as soon thereafter as counsel 
may be heard, in the courtroom of the Honorable 
Gordon R. Hall, one of the judges of the above 
entitled court at the Courts Building, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, why you should not permanently 
and absolutely be restrained and prohibited from 
proceeding in the respects and particulars above 
stated and more particularly complained of in 
the verified petition on file herein and why peti-
tioner should not have such other and further re-
lief as may be appropriate in the premises." 
(Temporary Restraining Order called "Alter-
native Writ of Prohibition, R-14-15; Court Min-
ute Entry, R-24). 
There was no attempt by the plaintiff-appellant to 
comply in any regard with the provisions of Rule 65 of 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure in obtaining said tempo-
rary order. They failed to even allege, let alone state 
facts sufficient to show how they would be irreparably 
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harmed or damaged. The judge failed to note thereon 
the date and time when issued and failed to state that 
the order would expire within ten days, unless the order 
was reissued. Further, and most importantly, the plain-
tiff-appellants failed to post any security to indemnify 
the City or Gibbons and Reed from any of the damages 
and losses which would inherently flow from halting this 
construction project in midstream. 
Therefore, the City Attorney attempted to contact 
Judge Snow concerning the order; however, he was on 
vacation. The law anil motion judge set the matter 
aside ex parte pursuant to the provisions of Rule 65, 
which provides that the court can set aside an ex parte 
temporary restraining order on ". ' . . such notice as the 
court may prescribe." Because of its inherent defects, 
no notice was deemed necessary to vacate the tempo-
rary restraining order by the court; but the hearing date 
on the order to show cause why such a restraining order 
should not be issued was still in effect. Subsequent 
cross motions for summary judgment were filed. All 
matters were set for hearing on the order to show cause 
date of August 15, 1974 at 2:00 p.m. (R-28-31). 
These matters were transferred from Judge Hall 
to Judge Croft of the Third District Court. Judge 
Croft indicated that he did not have sufficient time to 
prepare for the matter August 15 and, pursuant to an 
agreement between all counsel, the matter was contin-
ued for hearing August 19, 1974. On August 19, 1974, 
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the court considered the memorandums, affidavits and 
matters of record before the court. Third District Court 
Case No. 220475 and Case No. 221266 were consolidat-
ed for hearing and the court heard oral arguments by 
all counsel. 
At the hearing the court also noted that the Al-
ternate Writ of Prohibition was a temporary restrain-
ing order and that the plaintiff-appellants had failed 
to comply with the provisions of Rule 65 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated: 
( T H E C O U R T ) : "My point is simply this. 
Before we leave it, I want to make it clear what 
I think on this matter and, that is, you filed a 
petition for a writ of prohibition. In connection 
with that you asked for a temporary restraining 
order." 
(MR. G U S T I N ) : "No, we did not, your 
honor." 
( T H E C O U R T ) : "Yes, you do. That's 
what he does. He temporarily restrains and or-
ders the defendants to appear and show cause 
why the writ shouldn't be made permanent, you 
see. What you are doing is, you file a petition 
and you want to restrain the defendants from 
doing something and what you are arguing, is, 
even though you are asking for a temporary re-
straining order, the rule with respect to tempo-
rary restraining orders doesn't apply and I don't 
agree with you." (Argument Transcript, R. 
382) 
Subsequently, after more discussion on the point, 
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Judge Croft stated that he could rule on Mr. Gustin's 
motion for summary judgment and resolve the question 
of whether a Writ of Prohibition should issue after the 
hearing. Mr. Gustin agreed; the record states as follows: 
( T H E COURT) : "If I grant your motion 
for summary judgment today, I can probably 
rule on the question of jurisdiction in any event. 
(MR. G U S T I N ) : "Right, so we will pass the 
matter and go to the motion for summary judg-
ment with reference to the injunction suit, civil 
no. 220475." (Argument Transcript, 383) 
Subsequently, the court after fully reviewing the record 
and hearing argument, denied the plaintiff-appellants 
motion for summary judgment and granted the City 
a partial summary judgment, reserving for trial only 
the issue of the contract validity. (Memorandum De-
cision of Judge Croft, R-41-53) 
I t is submitted that plaintiff-appellants have cited 
no case to justify their disregard for the provisions of 
Rule 65 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. They 
voluntarily submitted the matter for hearing and the 
lower court ruled as a matter of law that the improve-
ment district was valid. To now pose a procedural issue 
regarding the vacation of a temporaiy restraining order 
and the refusal of the lower court, after a full hearing, to 
reissue it, does not serve to illuminate this court on any 
germane issue. 
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POINT VI 
THE STATE MUNICIPAL IMPROVE-
MENT DISTRICT ACT SPECIFICALLY 
AUTHORIZES DELETIONS TO BE MADE 
FROM PROJECTS, AFTER BIDDING HAS 
BEEN COMPLETED; FURTHER, T H E CON-
TRACT TERMS OUTLINING T H E TERMS 
OF BIDDING AUTHORIZES SUCH DELE-
TIONS TO BE MADE BY THE CITY. 
The City adopts the brief of Co-Defendant-Re-
spondent Gibbons and Reed on this point. 
POINT VII 
THE CONTRACT SUBJECT OF THE 
WITHIN LITIGATION WAS LET TO THE 
LOWEST RESPONSIBLE BIDDER. EXTRA 
WORK ORDERS AND COSTS INCURRED 
DUE TO THE CHANGES IN PLANS AND 
SPECIFICATIONS, WHICH WERE MADE 
IN GOOD F A I T H AND WITHOUT COLLU-
SION OR FRAUD AND NOT MOTIVATED OR 
INFLUENCED BY PERSONAL FAVORIT-
ISM OR ILL WILL, ARE INCLUDED WITH-
IN THE ORIGINAL CONTRACT BID AND 
NEED NOT BE SUBMITTED FOR ADDI-
TIONAL AND SEPARATE BIDDING PRO-
CEDURES. 
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The City adopts the brief of Co-Defendant-Re-
spondent Gibbons and Reed on this point. 
SUMMARY 
The creation of a special improvement district is 
a legislative function of Salt Lake City Corporation 
and, as such, the acts of the legislature are presumed 
to be valid, lawful and within the scope of legislative 
authority. Further, judicial review of those legislative 
actions in creating a special improvement district is 
limited to those areas charging that acts of the City 
were arbitrary, capricious, grossly unjust or inequit-
able, or that the City lacked lawful authority or juris-
diction to proceed. The party attacking the District has 
the burden of proof concerning these elements. In addi-
tion, in evaluating the conduct of the city legislative 
body against applicable state law, the City must only 
be in "substantial" compliance to those statutory re-
quirements. Plaintiff-appellants have wholly failed to 
meet that burden in this challenge to the Improvement 
District. 
A review of the facts in this case clearly demon-
strates that all of the conditions and requirements for 
establishing a special improvement district were "sub-
stantially" complied with. The Notice of Intent stated 
the "purpose" of the District and stated in a "general 
way" the improvements to be made. The challengers 
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assertion that detailed and specific notices as required 
under a repealed law in effect in 1917 is not well taken. 
However, even if the court were of the persuasion 
that a detailed and specific Notice of Intention should 
be published, the City has complied. In the Notice of 
Intention, the City incorporated by reference the de-
tailed plans and specifications of this project which 
were filed with the City Engineer. These plans gave 
all persons concerned constructive notice of the minute 
details of grade changes, alterations of traffic flow pat-
terns and changes in space allocations for pedestrian 
and vehicular traffic. 
Further, the street right-of-way was not narrowed 
as charged; rather, the City exercised its statutory pow-
ers to decide how much of it should be used for vehicular 
and pedestrian traffic. Again, even accepting arguendo, 
the challengers position that failure to pass an ordinance 
concerning an alleged narrowing of the street is not a 
matter which goes to justice, equity or jurisdiction as 
to void this improvement district. 
In addition, even accepting arguendo the position 
of plaintiff that the district was created with defects in 
the Notice of Intent, those defects do not rise to the level 
to require this court to enjoin or halt construction. 
Rather, only those specific items which are subject to 
improper notice may be subject to attack, after the tax 
assessment has been levied by the city. The city can 
pay those items which may have not been properly sub-
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ject to assessment in the district. In this case, the prop-
erty owners total construction cost is $505 per front 
foot; the balance of the costs will be paid from city 
capital improvements budget. Even if the court finds 
some defects, it is premature to object to the district 
on those items until there has been an attempt to levy 
a tax for them. 
This Main Street Improvement Project is approxi-
mately one-third completed. The work, planning and 
expense which has been undertaken since 1963 should 
not, at this point in time, be destroyed. The Main Street 
Improvement District should be upheld and allowed 
to proceed to culminate, by completion of the final 
two blocks. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R O G E R F . C U T L E R 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent 
Salt Lake City Corporation 
101 City & County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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rxx- J7 IULH u a . / \ 
NOTICE 
NOTICE IS H E R E B Y G IVEN by the Board of Commissioners of 
Salt Lake City, Utah, of the intention of such Board of Commissioners 
to make the following described improvements: 
To remove all existing curbs, gutters, sidewalks and street paving 
and construct new street paving, pedestrian paving, landscape struc-
tures, planters and planting, curbs and gutters, together with new 
street lighting and drainage structures, and to do all other work neces-
sary to complete the project in accordance with Salt Lake City Stan-
dards. 
All the street frontage in this extension, upon which improvements 
are to be made, will be assessed up to an amount not to exceed. 
$505.00 per front foot, with the City to absorb all additional amounts as 
determined from the Urban Designer's estimates. 
This extension will be constructed within the following described 
area and boundaries and upon the following named street: 
A R E A : Blocks 57, 58, 69, 70, 75 and 76 of Plat " A " , Salt Lake City 
Survey. 
B O U N D A R I E S : 
North — South Temple Street 
South — 3rd South Street 
East - State Street 
West - West Temple Street 
• S T R E E T : 
Main Street — South Temple Street to 3rd South Street 
I M P R O V E M E N T S A N D E S T I M A T E D COSTS 
P R O P O S E D 
I M P R O V E M E N T S 
Removals 
Est. Cost Per 
Front Foot 
Roadway and Underground 
Underlavmentfor 
Pedestrian Paving 
Pedestrian Paving 
Lighting/Electrical 
Landscape Structures 
Architectural Features 
Planting 
$31.864392 
60.085032 
26.981999 
166.123258 
39.078391 
81.294815 
41.617684 
57.954429 
Front Feet of 
Abutting Property 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
3,965.91 
Total 
Estimated Cost 
T26,371.31 
238,291.83 
107,008.18 
658,829.89 
154,981.38 
322,407.92 
165,051.99 
229T«42.05 
Total Estimated Abutter's Cost Exclusive of 
Extra Costs for Structural Slabs ....$2,002,784.55 
Abutter's Total Rate $505.00 x 3,965.91 feet $2,002,784.55 
Total Estimated City's Cost 872,405r2e 
T O T A L E S T I M A T E D COST OF T H E P R O J E C T $2,875,189.75 
All other necessary things shall be done to complete the whole proj-
ect in a proper and workmanlike manner according to plans, profiles 
and specifications on file in the office of the Salt Lake City Engineer 
and to defray the Abutter's Portion of the cost and expense of said im-
provements by a Special Tax or assessment to be paid in ten (10) 
eaual annual installments, plus seven percent (7%) interest on the 
unpaid balance levied according to the front or linear foot frontage 
upon and against all lots, pieces or parcels of land to be benefited and 
affected by said improvements. The whole amount of the tax may be 
paid without interest within fifteen (15) days after notice by the Salt 
Lake City Treasurer of the amount due. 
The abutter's estimated cost per front foot does not include the 
extra costs resulting from structural slabs at underground vaults; the 
cost of which will vary according to the area to be covered. These 
costs are estimated to be approximately $15.00 per square foot of the 
structural area. The structural slab extra costs will be assessed against 
the properties benefited in addition to the assessment at the 
aforementioned rate of cost per front foot of abutting property. 
All protests and objections to the carrying out of such intention 
must be presented in writing, stating therein, lot, block or description of 
property, together with the number of front feet to the City Recorder 
on or before the 16th day of January, 1974. The Board of Commission-
ers at its first regular meeting thereafter, to-wit, the 17th day of Janu-
ary, 1974, will consider the proposed levy and hear and consider such 
protests and objections to said improvements as have been made. 
B Y O R D E R OF T H E BOARD O F COMMISSIONERS O F SALT 
L A K E CITY, U T A H . 
Dated this 18th day of December, 1973. 
H E R M A N J . H O G E N S E N 
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